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Introduction1
What is healing? In the contexts of post-atrocity and post-genocide, the term healing is
metaphorical, and, like all metaphors, it functions by highlighting some similarities at the cost
of hiding some differences.2 To understand what kind of collective healing practices might be
effective after a mass atrocity, we need to comprehend better what constitutes healing. This
requires appreciating in what ways the metaphor illuminates and obscures. The question “what
is collective healing?” raises entirely different concerns pertaining to the nature of groups,
communities, and institutions. In what ways are collective healing processes different from
individual ones?
We need clear, well-argued answers to these conceptual questions as a basis for
deriving the criteria to evaluate practices. What counts as a good collective healing process? The
evaluative criteria delineate what counts as collective healing and de ne what counts as
relevantly good. These evaluative criteria cannot be discovered by empirical investigations
alone. It requires a semantic de nition of the relevant normative spaces.
The plan is as follows. I shall argue that the concept of healing requires that of being
wounded, which in turn requires the idea that some agent performed dehumanizing actions. I
will present a new theory of dehumanizing as different kinds of harm and provide a new
characterization of healing based on this analysis. The main conclusion of the paper is that there
are four different but indispensable aspects of the healing process that are often con ated. Such
a conclusion can help us identify the different elements that make collective healing more
complete.
Section 1: Preliminaries
The idea of healing requires that there is something that needs to be healed, and following the
metaphorical semantics, the corresponding term is “being wounded.” The concept of “healing
wounds” has both evaluative and factual aspects: healing is good, and wounds are bad. We
need to understand what constitutes the relevant kinds of goodness and badness and
distinguish (a) the causes of a wound, (b) what constitutes the wound, and (c) the symptoms of
being harmed, concentrating on the nature of the woundedness (i.e. (b). Why is being wounded
bad?).
A wound is clearly some form of harm. However, we can contrast being wounded and
undergoing material harm. Something can harm one materially without wounding one, and vice
versa. In the rst case, losing money can cause one harm without constituting being wounded
because the latter implies that someone deliberately performed harmful actions. Likewise,
having one’s money stolen is different from merely losing it, and having one’s leg severed by
someone is different from losing it accidentally. Being wounded requires that someone
performed an act of wounding. In the second case, one could be wounded without being
harmed materially, for example, by being shunned from society without being physical
deprived. A person could be treated as less than human and thereby wounded, without being
harmed materially. Whilst such dehumanization typically involves material harm, and typically
causes psychological harm, it needs to be understood as something bad itself, independently of
1
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these other harms. Being dehumanized itself constitutes a special and grievous kind of harm. In
the next section, we shall argue that this harm consists in a violation of one’s value as a person.
As we will see, this will enable us to characterize trauma. Also, the need for this distinctive kind
of harm reoccurs within the notion of justice: justice can be understood as being treated equally
as a person.3
Section 2: Dehumanization
“Being wounded” describes being a recipient of an action that dehumanizes or treats one as less
than fully human. Dehumanization is not an act of removing the humanity from a person,
which is impossible, but rather one of not recognizing it. People can suffer tremendous harm
and trauma from natural disasters, but it is quite different to receive them deliberately at the
hands of other people. This is, and is perceived as, something they did to us. This merits the
phrase “being wounded.”
The concept of dehumanizing assumes that persons have a special kind of noninstrumental or non-derivative value, a quasi-Kantian idea best elaborated in two steps. First,
material things have only instrumental value, which implies that their valuable nature is
entirely derivative of the goals that they serve or promote. Without the relevant ends, the means
would have no value at all. Second, the ends themselves have a value that is also derivative,
dependent on the value of lives of conscious beings. This second dependence is not
instrumental. Rather, the plethora of ends that one has are only valuable in relation to the
valuable nature of living as a conscious being. They are only valuable insofar as they relate to
the activities, experiences, and processes that compose a life. Thus, we may conclude that the
lives of conscious beings have a special kind of non-derivative value. Dehumanization is a
violation of or a failure to recognize that value.
The account given so far is Kantian in spirit insofar as it argues for the special value of
persons. Kant contended that this value was the foundation of morality, enshrined in the
formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the second version of which enjoins people not to
treat humanity merely as a means.4 However, our account is only quasi-Kantian in at least two
respects. First, it is not tied to Kant’s metaphysics, such as his transcendental idealism. This is
important when we consider group healing.5 Second, Kant is trying to de ne morality.6 In
contrast, our point is to characterize a special kind of harming, dehumanization, which occurs
in violent atrocities. We have not advanced any claims about morality.
These deliberations show that conscious beings and their lives have a special kind of
value that is non-derivative. We have not shown that only conscious beings have non-derivative
value. Also, we have not taken into account the differences between human and person.
Caution is required to avoid speciesism. Standardly, a person is de ned as a being that is
rational and self-conscious. In this context, “rational” is opposed to non-rational rather than
irrational. It is the capacity to respond to reasons. Self-consciousness is the ability to be aware of
oneself as “I.” Given these de nitions, not all persons are humans: other species qualify. Also,
not all humans are persons; people in a permanent irreversible coma would not qualify as
persons. Moreover, the differences between person and non-person are multi-dimensional and
of degree, not a sharp difference of kind as presupposed by Descartes and Kant.7 Human
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embryology and animal intelligence requires these points.8 Having mentioned these
quali cations, to simplify, we shall treat the terms “human” and “person” as interchangeable.
Dehumanization occurs when a person is treated as an object or as less than a person.
The core idea is that a being that has non-derivative value is treated as if she were valuable only
derivatively. In this way, dehumanizing constitutes a failure to respect and appreciate the nature
of the kind of value of a person. It is a category mistake like the opposite of imbuing a fetish
doll with life.
Dehumanizing has several variants such as instrumentalizing, commodifying,
objectifying, animalizing, marginalizing, and demonizing. A person is instrumentalized when
she is treated as having only instrumental value. Kant expresses this with the second version of
the Categorical Imperative.9 A person is commodi ed when she is treated as a commodity,
which has only exchange-value. A person is objecti ed when she is treated merely as an object.
Likewise, a person is animalized when she is treated merely as a non-person animal in some
regard, for example, when a group is compared to a cockroach or some vermin.10
Although these phenomena are variations on a theme, to understand marginalization
and demonization, we need some ancillary ideas. To explain marginalization, the
supplementary notion is the equality of all persons. We have explained dehumanization in
terms of a person’s life being non-derivatively valuable: dehumanization is a failure to respect
the person as such. We supplement this with the claim that all persons are equally valuable in
this way. We marginalize a person by treating them as less valuable or as inferior. The claim that
all people have equal non-derivative value does not mean that one has equal responsibility
towards all, but it does mean that there is a good reason not to treat anyone as lesser.
The idea of demonization requires a deeper level. There is an ingrained tendency for us
to judge our own actions by the good intentions that we have, which are seemingly obvious to
us, and to judge the actions of others by the imperfect consequences of their actions. This is an
epistemological asymmetry or double standard.11 This is accentuated by reading the bad
consequences of a person’s action back into her intentions. According to this lopsided
hermeneutic, whilst I (or my group) always have good intentions, the others (you, my enemy)
have bad intentions as evidenced by your bad actions.12 This enemy-making mode of
interpretation constitutes a form of dehumanization because it forms one way to treat a person
or group as lesser. This kind of dehumanization is demonizing.
With the atrocities of war, dehumanization apparently consists in spurts of violent acts
directed towards one group by members of another group. However, dehumanization does not
need to be explicitly violent in this way. For instance, the prelude to an atrocity usually consists
in protracted propaganda warfare that dehumanizes the other group, portraying them as less
than fully human: it usually demonizes, after marginalizing them. Following a violent con ict,
the resulting wounds are typically handed down to future generations as feelings of
humiliation, victimization, and enmity, which become embedded in a culture and a history,13 as
narratives that tend to perpetuate the conditions that originally led to the con ict. As we shall
see, one can characterize trauma as the experience of the various harms of dehumanization as
such, and the traumatic effects of dehumanization can be transmitted transgenerationally.
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Violence breeds violence. Without intervention, cycles of violence are a never-ending
dehumanization. Violence is a cause of further trauma, but often also a symptom of trauma.14
Section 3: Dehumanization as Harm
Why is being dehumanized a serious harm? The answer pertains to the structure of human
well-being. While one can harm a person by stealing her money, such harms are derivative.
Thus, we require an account of non-derivative harm to a person’s well-being, which has the
following four basic dimensions.15
The rst concerns activities. For a person to live well, her life is comprised of processes,
activities, and experiences suited to her basic interests, given the relevant socio-cultural
contexts. To be deprived of such activities constitutes one dimension of harm. Secondly, for a
person to live well, she must appreciate these activities as non-instrumentally valuable. Pain,
anxiety, anger, and sadness constitute forms of ill-being along this dimension of awareness.
Thirdly, a good life will contain good relationships with other people and with society, and for
these to constitute well-being, she must recognize them and engage in them as such. Fourthly,
well-being requires appropriate kinds of evaluative self-awareness, meaning that a person is
aware of herself as a being of value or dignity.
Notice that this four-fold account of well-being is fundamentally non-hedonistic. It
characterizes harm without reducing it to unpleasant feelings. Changes in well-being can occur
along any of the four dimensions, and not just the second. They are often counterfactual, and
hence do not have to be even felt as a loss or gain.
Being dehumanized constitutes a special form of ill-being along each of these
dimensions, which is typically experienced as a trauma. For the purposes of this paper,
“trauma” can be de ned as the experiential and psycho-physical symptoms or manifestations of
these harms of dehumanization. The term refers to the negative ways in which the various
harms of dehumanization are experienced as such by the person.
Typically, the harm is especially grave concerning the fourth dimension: one’s
relationship to oneself. Well-being requires that a person emotionally appreciate herself as
having non-derivative value. This recognition is a fundamental form of self-respect that does
not depend on what one does or has done. Rather, in the worlds of money and commodities,
values are derivative on the valuable nature of a person’s life, and one’s well-being is partly
constituted by one’s awareness of this. This evaluative self-perception de nes one’s relationship
with oneself, and harm to it will be expressed as feelings of insecurity, a sense of inferiority, an
over-willingness to please others, and a feeling of powerlessness. It will also express itself in the
person’s relationships with their past and future, such as the erosion of one’s sense of oneself as
an agent, and through basic self-identi cations as a member of a victimized group. At root,
these manifest damage to the evaluative self-perception often called dignity, and being
dehumanized by others typically causes this kind of harm. These points help de ne one
important strand of the healing process: the appreciative emotional connections to one’s dignity.
Dehumanization is also a signi cant harm along the third dimension: to one’s
relationships, including one’s belonging to a society. Of course, being marginalized and treated
as inferior cause harm, but the issue is that they constitute a kind of harm integral to
dehumanization. All persons are equally non-derivatively valuable and we all live in societies,
so it is a deep harm to be treated as a less than full member of society. Dehumanization is also a
harm concerning intergroup relationships. While it causes serious damage to a person’s
capacities to trust and to have close relationships, dehumanization is itself a harm to the
relationships between the groups, as this implies they are degraded. This degradation manifests
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as mistrust and hermeneutical stereotyping. The degradation is iterative; it concerns not only
how you perceive me and vice versa, but also my beliefs about how you perceive me, and so on.
Concerning the second dimension, dehumanization is harmful insofar as it involves
negative emotions that plague a person’s consciousness and reduce their capacity to enjoy the
valuable activities of life. Sadness, fear, and anger blight our living in the present moment.
Dehumanization and its accompanying trauma involve feelings of helplessness, alienation, and
humiliation which form part of an unwitting construction of a phenomenal world blighted by
self-reinforcing feelings of negativity.
So far, we have characterized the harms of dehumanization of an oppressed group. We
can apply the same framework to an oppressor group. Note that, often, the same group
occupies both roles: perpetrators often act in dehumanizing ways from a sense their own
victimhood, and this double role accelerates the historical cycles of violence. But how is the
oppressor group dehumanized and thereby harmed? Such groups tend to have feelings of
superiority around historical narratives that apparently justify their privilege, and this
constitutes a form of self-dehumanization and harm. Three steps support this view.
First, when one group is marginalized, it is treated as less than equal.16 Well-being
requires that a person lives in harmony with how things are for the kinds of beings we are. In
this context, “how things are” means not only recognizing emotionally that one is nonderivatively valuable, but also appreciating that one is a member of a community of many other
people that have the same status. I am a member of a kind, but only one member of this kind:
there are others, equally as real and valuable as me. When our emotions close us off to this
truth, it constitutes a dehumanizing harm. For this reason, there is a group of illnesses that
include being closed in on oneself, being obsessed with one’s own self-importance, not being
connected to the reality of others.17
The second step: to understand well-being, one needs to relinquish the hedonist
assumption that, for something to be part of well-being, the lack of it must feel bad; harm does
not need to feel bad. The basis for well-being is the constitutive structural features of any
human life. These are the dimensions of well-being that form different kinds of noninstrumental value or disvalue. These include the relational, which requires that we relate to
others as persons. To live with others, I must appreciate them as persons. This has implications
for self-awareness: I must be aware of myself as one among many.
Third, the requirement that we relate to others as persons extends to self-consciousness:
we need to be aware of ourselves as one among many. Hence, well-being requires that one
regard oneself as one, but only one, member of a special kind of being. We are not asserting that
well-being requires one to conform one’s actions to a noble and demanding moral principle.
Instead, we are af rming that one’s well-being constitutively requires that we identify ourselves
as one among others, who are equally real as oneself.
In conclusion, what is new about this general theory of dehumanizing? First, it is not a
moral theory. It explains dehumanization as a harm and not as a Kantian moral imperative.
Second, the theory of harm is multi-dimensional, and it is not hedonistic or preference-based.
This has allowed us to characterize dehumanization as a non-reducible variety of different
harms, which will enable us to separate different aspects of the healing process in a detailed
manner.
Section 4: The Concept of Healing
The claim that dehumanization is contained in the concept “they did this to us” suggests the
seductive idea that the process of healing must be one of humanization, as the opposite of
dehumanization. However, this is mistaken because dehumanization is not the removal of the
special value of being a person. It is the failure to recognize it. We are already equally persons,
non-instrumentally valuable beings. One cannot humanize a human; one cannot restore to a
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person her dignity because she had it all along. In this sense, treating healing as a humanization
is part of the problem: it assumes that some people are lesser until they are healed. This
misleading conception affects practice insofar as it presumes that victims need to be given
something, namely a cure. This conception tends to negate the agency of the wounded person in
healing. This is a shortcoming of the medical analogy that implicitly compares the person to a
patient. Medical language suggests that a traumatized person is a passive patient, who receives
treatment from another, who is ideally an expert. Conceived in these terms, the processes tend
to undermine themselves: insofar as one regards someone as a passive patient, one is not
treating them as a full human person.
The misleading medical suggestion that the wounded person needs to be given
something, also permeates the idea that healing is a restoring of wholeness, even though the
etymology of “healing” suggests such a conception.18 However, since a person is already a
whole, the claim that a person needs to have her wholeness restored reinforces the idea that the
traumatized are less than wholly human and that something needs to be done by someone else
to reestablish this. This is quite different from af rming that they have been treated by others as
lesser, and they have a ruptured sense of their worth because of this. Even a dissociation
manifested as a personality disorder is a fracture in a person’s sense of themselves. It is a
dissociation in self-perception that manifests as a personality dissociation as if there were
distinct personalities.19 In short, healing the wounds concerns cohesive emotional selfperception rather than the bringing together of broken parts.
The opposite of dehumanization is not humanization. The core problem of
dehumanization is that the humanity of the person is actively denied or is not recognized. Such
treatment is deeply harmful, and this harm is multi-dimensional. For instance, it can lead a
person to fail to connect emotionally to her dignity or non-instrumentally valuable nature.
Therefore, the opposite of dehumanization is the process of fully recognizing the valuable
nature of oneself. This indicates that healing is a holistic educational process of coming to terms
with something wounding, which includes overcoming the dehumanizing and working
through its harmful psychological effects. van der Hart et al. call this kind of process
“realization.”20 The dehumanizing harm and the associated trauma present themselves as
un nished business21 that needs to be resolved through processes of realization or coming to
terms with what was done to one.
The idea of coming to terms needs explanation. Consider the process of coming to
terms with one’s own death. Clearly, it is not a simply cognitive exercise restricted to
propositional knowledge; it is also an emotional adaptation to a set of truths that are dif cult to
accept. This means that the process of fully understanding one’s death requires an acceptance
that may involve feeling fear, sadness, and anger. In this sense, it is cognitive-emotional or
holistic. Because it is a painful process, one will have deep resistances to directly confronting
one’s nitude. Those resistances are fundamentally an unwillingness based on anxieties and
phobias, which may involve self-deception. This means that the person has to be willing to
come to terms with those resistances as part of the process, and this indicates that the need for
meta-cognition, accompanied by considerable patience with oneself. It requires, for instance,
understanding that one’s resistances serve a protective function so that one is less inclined to
judge oneself harshly and punish or persecute oneself in this regard.22 This implies that healing
relies importantly on the person’s willingness to engage with the process. Insofar as it concerns
self-perception, it is something that a person does to herself. It is not carried out by someone
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else, such as a therapist or a therapeutic group. It is something that the person actively does
herself, albeit with the guidance of a facilitator and a group, even when the healing would not
have occurred without those supportive conditions.
Regarding dehumanization, healing processes are not individualistic because the
relevant harms are in icted by another group, and so the healing concerns one’s relationship
with them, and society in general. The dehumanizing harm is irreducibly social in content, and
so is the required healing process. Healing must be understood primarily in terms of a
juxtaposition between, on the one hand, emotional self-perception, and self-relations and, on
the other, relations to the members of the other group. This juxtaposition does not constitute a
contradiction, but rather different facets of the same action.
Any social action has three basic features. The rst is the action itself as performed by
an agent as an act of the will; the second is the consequences that it has on others and on the
agent herself; the third pertains to the social relations that the action instantiates or exempli es.
This general categorization applies to the actions that dehumanize and, as such, it serves to
classify the processes of compassionate understanding required for coming to terms with the
traumas and harms of dehumanization. The distinction enables us to separate three aspects of
any healing processes.
1. Understanding the dehumanizing actions and/or processes;
2. Transcending the personal harmful and traumatic effects of
these actions;
3. Repairing the relationships that dehumanizing instantiates.
In the nal sections, we will argue that this threefold characterization of the healing
process is incomplete because it omits a fourth element pertaining to the structural aspects of
social action and the systemic aspects of healing.
Process 1: Directed Towards Understanding the Dehumanizing Acts or Processes Per Se
This process helps the persons confront dehumanizing experiences by establishing a framework
for the relevant understanding and, in so doing, it initiates a process of meta-cognition: thinking
about what one does not fully grasp or want to come to terms with. This framework consists in
at least ve elements.
First, it must establish a shared space for healing as one in which participants will not
be judged, will be actively listened to, and in which their privacy will be respected. It constructs
the culture of a safe space. Safety is a precondition of healing.23 Second, it establishes a
framework in which victims, perpetrators, and others acknowledge the dehumanizing actions
in question, and recognize what makes them dehumanizing. Third, it provides an opportunity
to better understand why dehumanizing constitutes a serious harm along the four dimensions
of well-being. This entails comprehending emotionally what it means to dehumanize, to be
dehumanized, and why it is so bad. One way to accomplish this is to help participants
acknowledge how dehumanizing others is part of daily life, and how this cuts one off from the
experiential reality of the other. This process can help participants transcend guilt.
The nal two elements pertain to history. Acts of dehumanization occur as part of a
wider historical process and as such they can be understood. However, there is considerable
resistance to the idea that we might understand better, for example, the actions of Nazi
Germany in the Holocaust. The acts are so deplorable that any attempt to comprehend them
may seem like a refusal to condemn them. Nevertheless, any process of dehumanization can be
better understood even if this requires moving beyond moral condemnation, albeit without
rejecting it. The required understanding is largely historical: anti-Semitism has a long history in
Europe, much older than that of romantic German nationalism. Likewise, any con ict has a
history characterized by past acts of violence perceived differently by the various sides.
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Acknowledging the dehumanization of the history is part of the rst process of healing,
especially insofar as it involves seeing the history from different points of view, including those
of the denials that it generates.
Finally, the need for historical understanding introduces the idea that acts of
dehumanization constitute moments in a cycle of violence that will continue into the future
until transcended or healed. It involves seeing how the harmful effects of dehumanizing are
passed between generations through unintended social learning processes within families and
communities. This underscores the need for healing.
Process 2: Directed to the Results of the Dehumanizing Acts
Understanding dehumanizing acts enables a person to re ect better on her own painful
experiences; it strengthens the relevant meta-cognitive processes and prepares the person to
confront her pain. It prepares the person for the second part of the healing process, which
consists in becoming freer from the accumulated pain and other harms of dehumanization. This
release consists in coming to terms with past violence and the associated emotions, such as fear,
sadness, alienation, and anger.24 This process can be compared to mourning.25
In this process, the differences between victim and perpetrator are relevant for two
reasons. First, the harms suffered by the different groups in a con ict are usually very different.
For example, people of African descent in the USA may face the long-term effects of the
degradations of slavery, as well as the continued harms of systemic racism. Those of European
descent in the USA may face the shame of being the bene ciaries of this past, and the guilt of
being complicit in the systemic racism that makes them privileged.26 Since these are distinct
kinds of harm, the processes of coming to terms with them will be different. This suggests that
the two processes should be kept separate. Second, any healing process must feel safe and open
to all those concerned. Given that one group is working through its self-alienation as victims
and the other through its self-alienation as perpetrators, given that one group is transcending
feelings of inferiority and the other assumptions of superiority, given that one is often powerless
and the other usually powerful, the dual requirements of safety and openness are in
contradiction.27 For one group to be open is for the other group to feel unsafe. For this reason,
these two requisites can only be met if the healing of the two groups is separate.
Process 3: Directed to the Relationship
A healing that consisted only of processes 1 and 2 would be radically incomplete. This is
because healing requires going beyond the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator. This
conclusion follows from the social nature of dehumanization insofar as it is what one group
does to another. This means that healing must be relational, and involve a loosening of an
antagonistic us versus them.
This requires spaces that allow people to relate to each other intimately and openly.
They need to be able to express their pain, fears, and sadness, and to recount dif cult
experiences without feeling that they are being judged, and in the knowledge that others in the
group are listening to them. When people open up and reveal their suffering, it is almost
impossible not to be touched emotionally. Suddenly, one is presented with the vivid reality of
the experience of another person’s experience. This kind of experience has several welldocumented facets.28 First, as the members of the groups open their suffering to each other,
feelings of empathy overtake negative feelings, such as guilt, anger, and resentment that tend to
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fuel ignorance of the lived experience of the other. When it works well, this is a self-reinforcing
synergetic group process: any one person undergoing the process supports the others and vice
versa. This is one meaning of the term collective healing, and it requires a mixed group. Second,
in this process, people’s immediate self-identi cations shift. The sense of a shared group
weakens the divisions between us and them.29 Everyone is experienced as more fully human
and there is a growing shared sense that we are all people of equal worth. This constitutes a
moral ascension that connects with the lived reality of others, pierces the bubble of egoism and
widens parochial identities.30 Thirdly, this process diminishes the feeling “they did this to us”
and “we did this to them but it was not our fault (or it was a long time ago).” While this does
not imply negating what happened, it is a process of transcending the roles of victim and
perpetrator that carry the potential to recycle the violence accentuated through guilt and
blame.31 Insofar as this process is successful, people will tend to spontaneously want to ask for
forgiveness in a sincere way both as a recognition of the suffering of other persons and as an
acknowledgement of responsibility, and not as means to escape their own feelings of guilt.32
This is an important difference: the rst expresses a healing in the relationships; the second
remains individualistic.
In this type of relational healing, the process cannot be regarded merely as means to a
set of ends, such as reconciliation and forgiveness. Such a treatment would ignore the noninstrumental value of the process itself irrespective of ends. The process of people from different
sides in a con ict coming together and sharing in a spirit of honesty and openness is valuable in
itself. Furthermore, the process embodies the kind of mutual recognition between equal persons
as real humans without alienation. Forgiveness as a preset goal would tend to instrumentalize
these healing processes. However, it will not instrumentalize them when forgiveness is an
unforced expression of a healing of the relationships. If participants sense that the process has a
predetermined outcome, then they will feel used and manipulated in a process that should
otherwise be deeply intimate such that they feel able to share their fragility.
Some Conclusions
The rst step in our journey based the nature of healing on a new theory of dehumanizing as
harm. From this, we concluded that the healing process necessarily has at least three aspects,
which have different dynamics and criteria of success. Also, the theory revealed in what ways
the medical analogy of healing needs to be replaced with an educational one, understood as
holistic and transformative.33
Now, we shall take a second step because this argument has not yet directly considered
the collective nature of healing, nor indeed the fact that dehumanization is often institutional,
systemic, and structural.
Section 5: From Collective to Structural
We need to distinguish the harms associated with a speci c event (such as a school shooting or
a rape) from those caused by a whole series of events (such as a war). Dehumanizing harms can
be caused by a systemic and long-term maltreatment of a person or group and might not be so
readily recognized as such compared with a speci c dramatic event.34
The term collective suggests that the healing in question is of a collection of individual
acts. It is worth brie y spelling out why this is misleading in order to purge the tendency to
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conceive dehumanizing as atomic acts performed by individuals, which expunges an adequate
conception of its socio-political rami cations.35 For this reason, the word “collective” might be
replaced by “social.” For instance, in an atrocity associated with a war, the violent acts are
carried out by one group on another. This is not just a collection of individual acts; as a war
between nations or factions, it is ineluctably social. This implies that the meanings of the acts are
imbued with the social histories concerning the relations between the groups.36 The social
meanings of an atrocity require that the acts are something they (a group) did to us (a group),
and this means that the shared group histories are integral to the meanings of the atrocity, and
thus also to what should count as healing. Thus, individualism hinders the capacity to properly
understand social dehumanization. The term “the group” can refer to a nation, an ethnic group,
a religious community, so long as they share a persistent sense of sameness with each other.37
The sameness is what Vamik Volkan calls “large group identity,” which provides belonging and
protection to its members.38
Social dehumanization has some distinctive features. In such a case, the more anxiety
and stress the members of a victimized group are going through, the more they will tend to
hang on to the large group identity, and the more they share the psychological traits and
markers as the result of the dehumanizing harm. This is a self-reinforcing cycle. Likewise (and
secondly), if the victimized group suffers from ongoing deprivation, disempowerment, and
injustice, this also tends to strengthen the group identities. The symptoms and harms of
systemic dehumanization often serve as a reminder of people’s internalized large group
identity; the reminder is that “it is because of our identity (being Muslim, Jewish, indigenous,
African...) that we are suffering as a group.” The build-up of such social grievances reinforce the
dehumanized relationships between large groups, building an antagonistic us-versus-them,
which perpetuates the cycles of violence. Thirdly, these processes are reinforced by the negative
hermeneutics in virtue of which we tend to automatically read the intentions of enemy groups
as malevolent.39 These three reinforcing cycles combine to make healing process 3 increasingly
dif cult. Remember that process 3 requires that people transcend their local identities insofar
they can directly feel the suffering and the shared humanity of the other. The speci c dynamics
of group identities as de ned by structural social conditions render process 3 harder to attain.
This kind of conclusion has been challenged. When Lemkin originally de ned the
nature of genocide, he did so in terms of groups.40 For some writers, this is a problem. The
sociologist Rogers Brubaker uses the term “groupism” to specify “the tendency to treat ethnic
groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be
attributed.”41 Groupism or primordialism is accused of two related errors; the rst is reifying,
that is treating groups as entities, and the second is that of regarding them as homogeneous,
ignoring differences within the group.42
Since we need the idea of a group to understand collective healing, it is incumbent on
us to reply to these objections. We will do so by contrasting two types of views that are usually
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held in opposition to each other, and by arguing that both are mistaken. The rst is
individualism and the second is groupism. We will carve a position that is neither.
In one extreme form, individualism is the view that only individuals exist.43 This
confronts the obvious objection that universities, banks, and nation-states also exist, and that
these institutions can perform actions such as awarding degrees, making loans, and declaring
war. In reply, individualism can turn to the idea that, compared to individual human beings,
social institutions are not real because they are derivative. In this modi ed form, individualism
is the view that statements about institutions and social groups can be reduced to claims about
individuals. However, in counter-reply, this form of reductionism is also an implausible view
because any relevant statement about the behavior or actions of individuals will require
mention of their social roles, which will in turn require reference to the relevant institutions.
Statements about the social cannot be reduced to relevant claims about the behavior of
individuals because there is an ineliminable reference to roles and hence social institutions.44
We are tempted to cling to the remnants of individualism even in the face of these
severe problems because of the intuition that the alternative looks much worse. The idea that
groups and social institutions are entities that have interests quite apart from those of the
relevant individual persons looks mildly totalitarian.45 For example, it would be worrying to
treat the interests of a company as something over and beyond the interests of all its
stakeholders, as if those corporate interests could override those of all the stakeholders.
What saves us from this reifying view is Hobbes’ idea that the institution can only act
through an agent or persona or representative.46 The bank needs to hire branch managers to
make loans, and it needs executives to hire branch managers, and a board of directors to
appoint executives etc. Such assertions do not amount to individualism: it is still the bank or the
state that is acting, and its power of agency is not reducible to claims about individuals.
Nevertheless, at the same time, the institution cannot act except through individual agents who
are performing the roles as de ned by the relevant institutions. In short, institutions can act or
do things non-reductively and, consequently, individualism is false. However, this does not
mean that groupism is true: institutions are not like individual persons insofar as institutions
need representatives or role-occupants in order to perform actions.47 To avoid reducing
institutions, we do not need to reify them.
The conclusion that institutions can perform actions does not support the reifying claim
that they have non-instrumental interests beyond those of the relevant individuals. Clearly, an
organization or institution can have interests, but those interests are purely instrumental: they
pertain to its power and position, its nances and growth. They do not constitute noninstrumental interests such as those that pertain to the living and experiences of a conscious
being. Rejecting individualism does not require an implicit totalitarianism.
The conclusion that individualism is erroneous is important for healing in several ways.
It allows us to employ the notion of groups in characterizing atrocities and healing, obviating
the objections of groupism. Second, often to understand atrocities, we need the concept of
structural oppression. This is evident in the case of the North Atlantic slave trade because the
racial oppression inherent in slavery has continued past the date of abolition into the
contemporary world as structural racism.48 We need the idea that individualism is false to make
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sense of the notion of structural dehumanization, which is an important aspect of the relevant
healing processes. For instance, any healing process related to the North Atlantic slave trade
will need to address the wounds of contemporary structural racism insofar as this is possible.
For this claim to even make sense, we need the idea that social structures can dehumanize, an
idea that individualism cannot even allow.
The skeptic might persist: How can social structures dehumanize? They are not agents!
Social structures refer to the ways relevant institutions are systematically organized in relation
to each other, as de ned by a set of principles. This means that describing a social structure is
not the same as describing the human relationships and actions that occur within that structure.
Social structures involve a new emergent characterization, namely the relevant principles and
how they shape the relevant institutions, such as the nation-state or corporations. We need antiindividualist to be able to af rm that institutions can perform actions, and that claims about
such actions cannot be reduced to statements about individuals. Likewise, anti-individualism
allows us to assert that if particular institutions can dehumanize then so can a structured set of
institutions.
Given this, it is reasonable to conclude that we can refer to the dehumanizing actions of
one group against another without this being understood in terms of reductive individualism
and without this requiring some reifying groupism. Now, let us explore the relevance of this for
the concept of collective healing, or rather, social healing.
Section 6: The Conditions for Collective Healing
Earlier we described, among others, two kinds of social harm especially pertinent to
dehumanization. Being dehumanized by others will typically damage a person’s emotional selfperception that is often called dignity. When this dehumanization is systemic and violent, the
damage will be especially grave, but when it is integrated into the person’s group selfidenti cations, it is even more severe. Second, we mentioned the harm to a person of being
marginalized from a society because of dehumanization. This destroys the sense of belonging to
a wider community, and this results in the feelings of alienation and anxiety that erode the
appreciation of the valuable nature of one’s life activities. This effect is especially marked when
the marginalization is group-based and when it re ects power relations within a society. We
brie y discussed the resulting dehumanizing hermeneutics that demonize a group.
We have now purged the erroneous assumption that dehumanization is necessarily an
individual act. It can also be a society-wide process that involves groups, institutions, and even
the very structure of a society. However, the healing processes characterized in section 4 remain
largely at the level of individuals and groups, and do not take into account institutional and
structural dehumanization. In section 5, we defended and characterized the concepts of
institutional and structural dehumanization, but we have not yet speci ed their relevance for
healing.
Let us consider the example of racism. Racism can be de ned as the treatment of some
people, as members of a racial group, as inferior or as less than human or less than equal. It is a
phenomenon that has individual, relational, institutional, and structural features, which
constitute various kinds of dehumanization. Given this, we have a couple of problems. Our
earlier de nition of healing was directed towards individual and relation processes; it did not
include institutional and structural dehumanization. How might we include them, given that
they are not in the control of individual persons?
Additionally, one might ask: Can healing even take place when systemic injustice is
prevalent? How can people heal wounds when the stabbing is still occurring? In a social context
of systemic dehumanization, can individual and relational healing be effective? In reply, one
might contrast two opposing views: the political and the therapeutic. The former argues that
healing practices require that there is social justice: there can be no real healing without social
justice. The latter is that healing practices are purely psychological, and, because of this, they
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can occur successfully without social justice. Even in social conditions that are oppressive,
people can nd an integrated sense of themselves.49
Neither of these two views is entirely satisfactory. This is because both treat the political
and therapeutic, or the structural and individual, as if they were two competing factors on a par.
This is an error because social structures refer to the ways relevant institutions are
systematically organized in relation to each other, as de ned by a set of principles. This means
that characterizing a social structure as violent and dehumanizing is not the same as describing
the human relationships that occur within that structure. Structure is not reducible to
relationships between individual persons. Thus, dehumanizing involves a new element when
applied to political-economic structures. This new element is the principles that shape the
institutions and the way they dehumanize (such as the nation state, school, the corporation, and
the penal system). Consequently, we need to separate two kinds of questions. The most familiar
is: how do we improve relations within the existing system? The second is: how do we improve
or reform the system? The two questions are very different because they are aimed at different
kinds of change.
For this reason, only the relevant actor can directly halt the dehumanizing. Individual
dehumanizing needs to be eradicated by the persons who dehumanize; institutional
dehumanizing needs to be eliminated by institutions. Therefore, we should not pretend and
hope that psychological healing processes alone can shift institutional and structural injustice.
Social injustice can be prevented and resisted only through political actions that transform
institutions and their relationships, for instance, through legislation and public policy. Thus, we
should not presume that individual healing processes can be a substitute for socio-economic
reforms.50 For example, racial healing cannot replace racial equity. At the same time, the need
for the second does not deny the need for the rst. In the midst of structural oppression and
social violence, people can try to nd peace with themselves and to understand each other
better. People need to dehumanize each other less, so that they might live better lives, even if
the social system remains oppressive and con ictual.
Of course, healing can support social change and vice versa, even if they are not the
same. On the one hand, the political actions needed to transform the system become more
possible when increasing numbers of antagonistic groups stop dehumanizing each other. This
changes the culture. In this way, personal healing can support social reforms, even though it is
not undertaken for the sake of such changes. One reason why personal healing should be
clearly distinguished from social change, and should not be conceived primarily as a means to
the second is that one cannot cure the illnesses of a society through the healing of those who
suffer wounds because of those social illnesses! The knifed cannot stop the stabbing. Typically,
victims have less power, and their healing cannot carry that social weight.
On the other hand, social reforms can support a personal healing process. For instance,
in some circumstances, governmental actions constitute part of a societal-wide healing process.
For example, consider a universal declaration that acknowledges the equality of all persons
irrespective of ethnicity, nationality, and history; or a public acknowledgment of the suffering
caused to peoples of marginalized communities; or a public recognition of the systemic nature
of a history of degradation; or a governmental commitment to a set of institutional and policy
remedies. These governmental actions would transform the landscape of individual healing
processes.
Practically, these points about structural conditions imply that the three healing
processes outlined earlier are incomplete: they need to be supplemented by a fourth, one that
acknowledges and works on current structural dehumanization and injustice. Process 1 is
dedicated to understanding the nature of acts of dehumanization, and part of this is to uncover
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the relevant history, to show how present injustices and traumas have resulted from past of
maltreatment. It is only in the context of some shared historical understanding that antagonistic
groups can heal and reconcile.51 Now, we are suggesting that one may need an additional fourth
element in a healing process: namely, a shared acknowledgement and understanding of how
existing social structures dehumanize and an intention to overcome this. Within the safe space
created by and for the healing process, existing hierarchical power dynamics should have been
suspended and transcended insofar as this is possible. Ideally, within this temporary safe space,
the various in uences of the structures of exploitation and marginalization have been
bracketed. It is because of this that participants are able to attain a shared sense of their common
humanity by transcending local self-identi cations. But this temporary hallowed state stands in
stark contradiction to the massive structural injustice and dehumanization that increasingly
characterizes societies. Thus, even a successful healing process is only a temporary respite from
such structures.
Given this, the main aim of process 4 is to socially recontextualize healing, to recognize
its limitations, and to build a shared understanding of how the group might help overcome
oppressive and divisive structures. In this sense, it is de ned as a passage from transcending
local identities towards solidarity.52 It is a phase-transition from relational healing towards the
co-construction of some social reforms needed for justice. A fractured society needs to move
from enmity to unity. But this is possible only insofar as individual healing processes transform
into relational ones, and these relational ones become socially relevant for institutional and
social reforms.
Overall Conclusion
Our initial aim was to give a normative account of the concept of collective healing that would
illuminate the healing process. The core is the act of dehumanizing. We speci ed what is bad
about this act. Additionally, we characterized the various kinds of harm that follow from the
nature of this action. We de ned healing as a holistic overcoming of the act of being
dehumanized and as a coming to terms with its harms. This overcoming consists in connecting
directly to one’s value as a person or one’s dignity. To explain “coming to terms,” we argued
that that any social action has three basic features: the act itself, its harmful consequences, and
the social relations it exempli es. To these, we added a fourth: the structural social conditions
that enable the action. On this basis, we argued that the healing process must consist of four
very different processes: rst, understanding the act itself; second, working through its
individual harmful effects; third, transcending the antagonistic social relations; and fourth,
acknowledging and trying to overcome the structural conditions. We characterized each of these
four processes. We thereby saw how any collective healing process would be incomplete if it did
not involve these four elements and would be confused insofar as its did not distinguish them
in practice. Healing must encompass the individual, relational, and social, and understand their
differences.
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